No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
The Clause speaks of being put in “jeopardy of life or limb,” which as derived from the common law, generally referred to the possibility of capital punishment upon conviction, but it is now settled that the Clause protects with regard “to every indictment or information charging a party with a known and defined crime or misdemeanor, whether at the common law or by statute.” 1 Footnote
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1874) . The Clause generally has no application in noncriminal proceedings. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) . Despite the Clause’s literal language, it can apply as well to sanctions that are civil in form if they clearly are applied in a manner that constitutes “punishment.” 2 Footnote
The Clause applies in juvenile court proceedings that are formally civil. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) . See also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty under the False Claims Act constitutes punishment if it is overwhelmingly disproportionate to compensating the government for its loss, and if it can be explained only as serving retributive or deterrent purposes); Mont. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (tax on possession of illegal drugs, “to be collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied,” constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy). But see Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (a statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual). The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is essentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analysis. 531 U.S. at 263 .The Clause applies in juvenile court proceedings that are formally civil. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) . See also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty under the False Claims Act constitutes punishment if it is overwhelmingly disproportionate to compensating the government for its loss, and if it can be explained only as serving retributive or deterrent purposes); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (tax on possession of illegal drugs, “to be collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied,” constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy). But see Seling, 531 U.S. 250 (a statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual). The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is essentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 263 . Ordinarily, however, civil in rem forfeiture proceedings may not be considered punitive for purposes of double jeopardy analysis,3 Footnote
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeitures, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881 , of property used in drug and money laundering offenses, are not punitive). The Court in Ursery applied principles that had been set forth in Various Items of Pers. Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931) (forfeiture of distillery used in defrauding government of tax on spirits), and 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) , of firearms “used or intended to be used in” firearms offenses). A two-part inquiry is followed. First, the Court inquires whether Congress intended the forfeiture proceeding to be civil or criminal. Then, if Congress intended that the proceeding be civil, the court determines whether there is nonetheless the “clearest proof” that the sanction is “so punitive” as to transform it into a criminal penalty. Id. at 366 . and the same is true of civil commitment following expiration of a prison term.4 Footnote
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369–70 (1997) (commitment under state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act).
Footnotes 1 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1874) . The Clause generally has no application in noncriminal proceedings. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) . 2 The Clause applies in juvenile court proceedings that are formally civil. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) . See also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty under the False Claims Act constitutes punishment if it is overwhelmingly disproportionate to compensating the government for its loss, and if it can be explained only as serving retributive or deterrent purposes); Mont. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (tax on possession of illegal drugs, “to be collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied,” constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy). But see Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (a statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual). The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is essentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analysis. 531 U.S. at 263 .
The Clause applies in juvenile court proceedings that are formally civil. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) . See also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty under the False Claims Act constitutes punishment if it is overwhelmingly disproportionate to compensating the government for its loss, and if it can be explained only as serving retributive or deterrent purposes); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (tax on possession of illegal drugs, “to be collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied,” constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy). But see Seling, 531 U.S. 250 (a statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual). The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is essentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 263 .
3 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeitures, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881 , of property used in drug and money laundering offenses, are not punitive). The Court in Ursery applied principles that had been set forth in Various Items of Pers. Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931) (forfeiture of distillery used in defrauding government of tax on spirits), and 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) , of firearms “used or intended to be used in” firearms offenses). A two-part inquiry is followed. First, the Court inquires whether Congress intended the forfeiture proceeding to be civil or criminal. Then, if Congress intended that the proceeding be civil, the court determines whether there is nonetheless the “clearest proof” that the sanction is “so punitive” as to transform it into a criminal penalty. Id. at 366 . 4 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369–70 (1997) (commitment under state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act).
